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Does Keck Discrimination Make Any Sense? An Assessment of the Non-Discrimination 




Abstract The aim of this paper is to consider the approach taken by the European Court 
to discrimination in the post-Keck lines of cases. The previous Article 28 jurisprudence 
had not considered discrimination in any detail. Thus the Dassonville/Cassis case law 
had deliberately shunned GATT-style anti-protectionist methods in favor of a more 
dynamic attack on barriers to trade. However introducing discrimination analysis in Keck 
has presented problems as the Court has had to work out what kind of methodology to 
employ. The paper seeks to set out a general framework for understanding 
discrimination in EC internal market law more broadly. Discrimination involves treating 
similar situations differently. The framework consists of three types of similar situations 
that have been employed in the internal market case-law. These are termed market, 
regulatory and status equivalence. The post-Keck case-law is analyzed in this context. It 
is concluded that the Court has failed to employ any coherent discrimination methods in 
to non-product rules. It has failed to set out well-defined product markets where 
domestic and foreign products compete. It has also failed to establish disparate impact 
in these markets using convincing methods. Instead it has found ‘discrimination’ based 
upon judicial hunches or intuitions rather than clear criteria and objective evidence about 
conditions of competition in the product markets.  This has caused litigation to become 
unpredictable and has left both the European and national courts without any clear 
criteria for scrutinizing non-product rules. This is reminiscent of the problems that arose 
in the pre-Keck case-law but now the site of uncertainty is what constitutes 
‘discrimination’ rather than what amounts to a barrier to trade. In fact, the case-law 
exhibits a judicial sleight-of-hand which continues to lean towards the favored ‘barriers to 
trade’ test under the guise of discrimination analysis. It would be better either to adopt a 
precise GATT-style economic methodology or to find a coherent European alternative 
approach. This author favors the latter because the proper concern of EU internal 
market law since Dassonville has always been the removal of demonstrably arbitrary 
barriers to trade. Only where a trader can establish that a restriction is truly arbitrary 
should Article 28 bite. For many non-product rules this will rightly be very difficult to do 
because such rules pursue broad policy goals that are largely non-justiciable. 
 
A: Introduction:   
 
This paper analyses the evolution of the concept of discrimination within 
the EU internal market case-law. The aim is to situate EU law in the 
broader context of the anti-discrimination concept within trade law. The 
experience under the GATT shows that rigorous discrimination analysis is 
both complex and quite limited as a tool of market integration. That is 
perhaps why the European Court deliberately moved away from this 
approach in the Dassonville/Cassis De Dijon line of cases and thereby 
achieved rapid negative harmonization of product rules. Weiler has 
highlighted the historical background to this difference between the 
limited anti-protectionist approach of the GATT and the ECJ’s more 
dynamic emphasis on challenging barriers to trade.1  
 
                                                          
* The author would like to express his great appreciation to Professor Gareth Davies of Free 
University, Amsterdam for all his input into this article which is hugely appreciated. 
 
1
 JHH Weiler, ‘The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and Context in the Evolution 
of the Free Movement of Goods’ in Craig  P. and De Burca G.(eds), The Evolution of EU Law 
(Oxford, OUP, 1999) 
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The sudden introduction in Keck of discrimination as the tool for 
assessing non-product rules has required the Court to hastily revisit the 
concept. It will be argued that ‘Keck-discrimination’ has in practice proved 
to be an incoherent tool for considering non-product rules and this has led 
to considerable uncertainty amongst national courts seeking to apply it. 
 
B: Discrimination in EC Law 
 
There is no shortage of material from which to construct a model of 
discrimination in European law.  Whilst most prominent in the social field, 
the concept is still utilized freely in the areas of the free movement of 
goods, workers and citizens. Even in the area of services and 
establishment, where market access largely prevails, the Court still 
employs discrimination analysis on many occasions.2 Although market 
access language is now prevalent in the jurisprudence, a great many of 
these cases can be viewed as compatible with discrimination analysis. 
Discrimination has also attracted support from many academics as a 
workable and legitimate test to adopt in the law of the internal market.3 It 
leaves Member States with a large degree of autonomy to set regulatory 
standards but restrains them from acting in an arbitrary or protectionist 
manner. Despite this, discrimination analysis, as employed across the 
four freedoms, has not been put within a common framework.  
 
C: Three Types of Equivalence 
 
Although a critical concept, non-discrimination is not self-explanatory. For 
example, Barnard says: ‘ The principle of non-discrimination on the 
 grounds of nationality is the cornerstone of the four freedoms…This 
model presupposes that domestic and imported goods are similarly 
situated and that they should be treated in the same way.’4 The problem 
is that one cannot presuppose any such thing. One must have a criteria 
for determining which goods (or services or workers) are equivalent and 
hence worthy of equal treatment.  No credible discrimination model can 
exist without definitions of what we mean by equivalent or similar 
situations. A failure to treat equivalent situations the same is a hall-mark 
of arbitrary behavior.  
                                                          
 
2
 See for example C-17/00  De Coster v College des bourgmestre et echevins de Watermael-
Boitsfort [2001] ECR I-9445 and see the tax cases under Article 43 such as C-446/03 Marks and 
Spencer v David Halsey (HM Inspector of Taxes) Judgment of December 13, 2005, 
3
 See AM Arnull, AA Dashwood, MG Ross and DA Wyatt, Wyatt and Dashwood’s European 
Union Law (4th edn, London,  Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) G. Davies, Nationality Discrimination 
in the European Internal Market (Kluwer Law International, 2003), N. Bernard ‘Discrimination 
and Free Movement.’ (1996) 45 ICLQ 82,  C Hilson, ‘Discrimination in Community Free 
Movement Law’ ELRev [1999] 24(5) 445-462. For a position which recognizes a role for both 
discrimination and market access see N Shuibhne, ‘The Free Movement of Goods and Article 28 
EC: An Evolving Framework.’ ELRev [2002] 27(4) 408-425.  Maduro also favors a type of 
discrimination approach based upon correcting the political exclusion for importers in M. 
Maduro, We,The Court. The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998). 
4
 C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU (OUP, Oxford, 2004) at p18. 
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The core of this paper adopts a framework for analysis based upon three 
kinds of equivalence. They each take a different approach to this all-
important question of how a suitable comparator is identified. The three 
main kinds of equivalence are: market equivalence, regulatory 
equivalence and status equivalence. Market equivalence represents the 
standard approach within trade law approach to discrimination. As we 
shall see, however, the European Court has developed discrimination 
beyond this, using regulatory and status equivalence, in order to facilitate 
both market and social integration. 
 
(a) Market equivalence  
 
Goods and services that are within the same category according to their 
objective characteristics or uses are clearly equivalent in trade law terms.  
More broadly, we can say that economic actors show preference for one 
good or service over another. Where they are indifferent between choices 
we can consider those choices to be equivalents. Any difference in 
treatment, de jure or de facto, between such equivalents triggers an 
inquiry into whether protectionism is at work. This is an analysis which is 
essentially economic and empirical in nature. Its origins lie within general 
trade law as expressed in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
through the concept of ‘like’ products. 5 We see many examples of this in 
EC law. For example, consumer preference has been important in 
discriminatory taxation cases under Article 90. The ECJ has adopted the 
view under Article 90(2) that only if consumer preference indicates that 
goods are substitutes can a difference in treatment between them amount 
to protectionism.6 Even under Article 90(1), where the Court has 
employed more qualitative rather than economic tests, the ultimate 
question has been: are these goods substitutes based upon their 
characteristics and uses?7 In relation to Article 49, we sometimes find 
similar market-based assessments of the degree of competition between 
services being undertaken by the Court.8This is of course the 
methodology that is mandatory within the competition law field under 
Articles 81 and 82 where precise definition of relevant product markets is 
a sine qua non.9 10 There has been a vigorous debate within EC 
competition law about the extent to which rigorous economic tests 
                                                          
5
 See the concept of ‘like products’ within World Trade Organisation law at Article III GATT 
which encompasses physical characteristics, end-uses, tariff groups and consumer tastes as 
interpreted by the Appellate Body in European Communities – Asbestos (AB-2000-11) 12 March 
2001 WT/DS135/AB/R, 01-1157. 
6
 C-234/84 John Walker [1986] ECR 875. 
7
 C- 169/80 Commission v Italy (Marsala wine) [1980]  ECR 385. 
8
 C-17/00  De Coster v College des bourgmestre et echevins de Watermael-Boitsfort [2001] ECR 
I-9445. 
9
 C-27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207 and Commission Notice on Market 
Definition [1997] OJ C372/5.. 
10
 Similarly, employer market preference has been important in Article 141 cases. Male and 
female workers are considered to be equivalent if they perform the same work in market terms. 
This equivalence can also arise when they perform work of equal value is performed by an 
independent review of job classification which will take into training, skills and market demand 
for types of workers.C-127/92 Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority [1993] ECR 5535. 
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demonstrating quantifiable harm to consumers must be satisfied to justify 
regulatory intervention.11 There has however never been any doubt that 
precise economic analysis of the markets is required before regulators 
may intervene to correct market failure. 
 
(b) Regulatory equivalence  
 
Having considered the nature of equivalence from the perspective of 
economic actors, we turn now to regulators. Regulators make distinctions 
between products and services in order to promote public welfare. This 
may entail that products conform to, for example, minimum standards of 
safety, consumer information or environmental impact.   Whether non-
national goods or services are equivalent to home products requires a 
test of similarity based upon the policy objective being pursued. Thus 
imported goods which in practice satisfy the policy objectives of the 
regulator should be treated as similar to each other but not otherwise. 
There has recently been both academic and some judicial support for 
such an approach in relation to non-discrimination under the WTO 
agreements.12Rules should not be found to be protectionist when they 
indirectly restrict the marketing of imports that do not satisfy legitimate 
policy goals, even if such goods compete with domestic products in the 
market.  
 
Whilst in the WTO literature, regulatory purpose has been advocated as a 
means of limiting the reach of trade law and preserving state autonomy, 
in the EU context, it’s principal use has been, ironically, to remove trade 
barriers.  The principle of mutual recognition set out in Cassis13 creates a 
rebuttable presumption that goods lawfully sold in other Member State 
have been adequately regulated to meet host state policy goals. They are 
presumed to be the regulatory equivalents of goods allowed on the host’s 
market. This reflects the Court’s assumption  that Member States’ political 
systems and culture are sufficiently similar that each Member State can 
rely upon the others to adopt and police adequate regulatory standards. 14 
                                                          
11
 See for example J. Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement: The Economic 
Constitutional Law of the European Community (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002) and D Gerber,  
Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford, clarendon 
Press, 1998) but also see M. Monti, ‘Antitrust in the US and Europe: a history of convergence’, 
American Bar Association, Washington DC,14 Nov. 2001 and XXXIInd Report on Competition 
Policy (2002) by the European Commission which argue that maximizing consumer welfare is 
now a more central element of EC competition policy (and law?).   
12
 J Y Qin, ‘Defining Nondiscrimination under the Law of the World Trade Organization.’ 23 
Boston Univ. International L.J. 215 [2005]. For discussion of this type of equivalence in the EU 
and WTO contexts see G. De Burca, ‘Unpacking the Concept of Discrimination in the EC and the 
WTO’ in C Barnard and J Scott, The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the 
Premises (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002) and D Regan, ‘Regulatory Purpose and ‘Like Products’ 
in Article III.4 of the GATT (with additional Remarks on Article III.2)’ 36 Jour. World Trade 
Law 443 (2002). RE Hudec, ‘GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an 
“Aim and Effects” Test, in Essays on the Nature of International Trade Law (Cameron May, 
1999). 
13
 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
14
 Weiler talks of ‘functional parallelism’ to describe the ability for Member States to maintain 
different standards of regulation. See JHH Weiler, ‘The Constitution of the Common Market 
Place: Text and Context in the Evolution of the Free Movement of Goods’ in Craig  P. and De 
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The Court effectively gives the job of regulation to the home state and 
then ensures, through judicial review, that the host state does not 
unjustifiably discriminate against the home state’s regulatory standards 
by arbitrarily denying goods access to the host market. It is important to 
note that the Cassis approach is focused upon relatively minor disparities 
in product specification rules between Member States (rather that those 
attributable to vast differences in regulatory goals or culture).15 
 
Despite this emphasis on removing trade barriers, even within EU law, 
there have been occasions where recourse to a regulatory equivalence 
test has preserved Member State autonomy rather than undermined it. 
This has occurred particularly in relation to directly discriminatory 
measures aimed at environmental protection. In the famous decision in 
Walloon Waste for example, a market test of equivalence would have led 
to a finding of discrimination.16 The Court appeared to adopt the 
regulatory equivalence test so that, given the environmental goal of the 
policy, imported waste was not the same as waste produced at home, 
even if, from a ‘user’ perspective, the two products were identical.17 
Similar cases can be seen in relation to alleged discriminatory taxation 
under Article 90.  In Chemial, the products (alcohol produced by natural 
and industrial means) were clearly substitutes from a market perspective 
but from a regulatory perspective it was accepted that they were different 
because of their environmental impacts.18 Therefore the difference in their 
tax treatment did not amount to discrimination because they were not  
equivalents. In this context, we should note the vigorous debate in the 
WTO context concerning the extent to which the environmental impact of 
its production methods can permit regulators to treat a product less 
favorably than a competing, but less environmentally sound product. 19   
                                                                                                                                                             
Burca G.(eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, OUP, 1999), 349. 
15
 Within WTO law this is dealt with by reference to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. These do 
not employ discrimination concepts but rather rely upon largely procedural means to establish the 
arbitrary nature of barriers to imports. Importantly, however, these agreements do not create any 
presumption of marketability simply due to lawful marketing in the home state. 
16
 C-2/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-4431. 
17
 C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG vSchleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099 concerned an obligation 
imposed upon electricity companies to buy up all the renewable power produced in their locality. 
This was directly discriminatory against imported energy  which was equivalent from a market 
perspective. However the Court allowed the rules without saying if this was because imported 
energy was not the same as domestic renewable energy. It is arguable this was the basis for the 
decision, given the need to create and maintain a demand for such energy.  
18
 This contrasts with the more orthodox position established in the WTO context that the 
different environmental impacts of production methods cannot lead to a finding that goods are 
not ‘like’ products. See Dolpin Tuna I 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) where the Appellate body decided 
that dolphin-friendly tuna could not be a different product to other tuna. Although see European 
Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products 
WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) which accepted that carcinogenic properties of product meant that it 
was not like other products with the same functional characteristics. 
19
 There has been much controversy around how far production processes and methods (‘PPMs’) 
can be taken into account in defining ‘like’ products within the WTO system (see note 11 above 
and United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna , GATT BISD (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993)) but 
also within the context of public procurement within the EU itself. See Case C-513/99 Concordia 
Buses Finland v Helsinki Municpality [2002] ECR I-7213 and P Trepte, Reuglating Procurement 
(Oxford, OUP, 2004) at 362. 
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Finally, to complete the picture in relation to the EU internal market, 
regulatory equivalence has also featured in the case-law on persons. This 
occurs when comparing educational and professional qualifications for 
persons who migrate to other Member States. The Court and the 
legislature has taken the view that practicing professionals and trained 
workers can enter the same profession when they migrate to other 
Member States if they can be considered regulatory equivalents.20 The 
Court has however not adopted the full rigor of a Cassis-style 
presumption of compatibility with host state’s standards in establishment 
cases.  By contrast, for cross-border service providers based in other 
states who are regulated at home the Court has adopted a presumption 
that they are regulated to adequate standard to meet host state 
regulatory concerns.21  
 
(c) Status equivalence  
 
The most expansive kind of equivalence, we shall call status equivalence.  
This is rather different in character and is unique to EC law. It does not 
ostensibly concern market access, unlike those discussed at (a) and (b). 
Its focus is more social and political, addressing the inherent right of 
individuals to equal treatment derived from the Treaty prohibition on 
nationality discrimination. It seeks to ensure that Member States provide 
the same bundle of social, economic, cultural and other advantages to 
nationals and non-nationals. It began in the field of movement of persons, 
particularly workers, but has also been echoed in gender discrimination 
cases.22 The very fact of the status of being a lawfully resident migrant 
worker, rather than their professional qualifications or job classification, 
justified equal treatment. Thus migrant workers were held entitled to 
equal treatment in respect of social security, housing and other conditions 
in the host state that are granted to nationals.23 As the court put it in 
O’Flynn: 
 
‘Conditions imposed by national law must be regarded as indirectly 
discriminatory where, although applicable irrespective of nationality, they 
affect essentially migrants workers...or the great majority of those 
affected are migrant workers, where they are indistinctly applicable but 
can be more easily satisfied by national workers than by migrant 
workers...or where there is a risk that they may operate to the particular 
detriment of migrant workers...’[italics added]24 
 
                                                          
20
 C- 71/76 Thieffry v Conseil de l’ordre des avocats a la cour de Paris [1977] ECR 765   
21
 C- 76/90 Sager v Dennemeyer  [1991] ECR I-4221 and C-205/84 Commission v Germany 
[1986] ECR 3755 
22
 Secretary of State for Employment, ex p. EOC [1994] 2 WLR 409 where the issue was the 
discriminatory effect of UK law giving less employment protection for the mainly female 
population of part-time workers. 
23
 C-316/85 Centre Public d’aide Social de Courcelles v Lebon [1987] 2811. Although this case 
was specifically based upon Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68, the principle stems from Article 
12 EC Treaty. 
24
 Case C-237/94 John O’Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I-2617, para.20. 
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Their status as ‘denizens’ entitles them to be treated as of equivalent 
status to nationals. This is clearly a more political form of equality less 
concerned with overly economic issues. As AG Jacobs once put it ‘No 
other aspect of Community law touches the individual more directly or 
does more to foster that sense of common identity and shared destiny 
without which the ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ 
…would be an empty slogan.’25  
 
The more recent case-law on citizenship takes the same approach and 
bestows a status of equivalence upon EU citizens who migrate.26Thus 
their mere lawful presence in another Member State generates a right to 
equal treatment which is grounded in their status27 rather than any 
particular demonstration that they are suffering in competitive terms or 
being denied access to a market through regulatory barriers.28 As the 
Court put it in Sala ‘It follows that a citizen of the European 
Union…lawfully resident in the territory of the host Member State, can 
rely on [Article 12] EC in all situations which fall within the scope rationae 
materiae of Community law…’29  In order to prove discrimination in such 
cases the court has relied upon inference and assumption rather than 
requiring empirical evidence.30 The most important such assumption is 
that any linkage of a benefit to residence is indirectly discriminatory 
because non-nationals will be less likely to fulfill it.31 
 
It will be argued below that the Court in the post-Keck case-law attempted 
to move to a similar position in relation to importers of goods lawfully sold 
in the host state. These enjoy the status of ‘denizens’ in that they cannot 
be subject to conditions making it harder for them to sell on the host 
market. Imported goods in this situation are viewed as having equivalent 
status to domestic goods and therefore any disparate impact caused by 
the existence, nature or effect of host state regulations amounts to 
                                                          
25
 C-138/02 Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions  para 11 and C-209/03 Bidar v 
London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for Education and Skills. 15/3/05. 
26
 C-184/99 Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide social d’Ottigues-Louvain la Neuve [2001] I-6193   
27
 The Court has sometimes sought to maintain a bare link between the discrimination felt and a 
restriction on free movement but this is rather formal. See Konstantinidis v Stadt Altemsteig 
[1993] ECR I-1663 and Avello [2003] ECR I-11613. 
28
 Another example is that female workers have the same status as male workers as far as 
government regulations impact upon them. Where rules have a disparate impact upon female 
workers, then they must be justified if they are to be sustained. Women do not have to prove 
equivalence because they benefit from this status already. R v Secretary of State for Employment 
ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1994] 1 WLR 409 is a good example of this kind of 
reasoning in the UK House of Lords. 
29
 Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691 at para.63. Also Bidar at 
para.32. 
30
 For a critique of these assumptions see G Davies, ‘Any Place I Hang My Hat?’ or: Residence is 
the New Nationality.’ 11 European Law Journal [2005] 43 at 46-7. 
31C-209/03 Bidar v London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for Education and Skills. 
15/3/05 where a three-year settlement precondition was imposed on those seeking educational 
loans. In the case of gender equality, by contrast, a close examination of the statistical data on 
how rules affect men and women has been a feature in indirect discrimination cases. The 
complainant must show that a rule affects their gender more severely by reference to empirical 
evidence rather than relying upon presumptions. Case 96/80 Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing 
Productions) Ltd [1981] ECR 911.  
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discrimination.32 
 
C: Equivalent Situations and the Evolution of the Case-law on Goods 
 
(a)  Dassonville to Cassis –  Market Equivalence and Similar  Goods 
 
The above model of equivalent situations in helpful is explaining the 
evolution of the decisions of the ECJ in the field of goods. The famous 
definition of an MEQR under Article 28 laid down in Dassonville was 
extremely wide and did not mention discrimination of any kind.  Despite 
this, the case was actually decided on the basis of indirect discrimination. 
The Court said that the rules on certificates of origin were such that ‘only 
direct importers are really in a position to satisfy without facing serious 
difficulties.’33It concluded that because the certificate of origin was less 
easily obtainable by indirect importers it was consequently an MEQR. In 
terms of equivalence, this was an easy case because the products being 
compared were physically the same, so the Court only had to consider 
the disparate impact of the rules.  The facts presented no difficulty in 
identifying the relevant comparator. 
 
Around the time of the Cassis decision we find the Court again 
considering situations where the goods subject to disadvantage are 
identical to home goods. Thus the Court said of price restrictions on 
certain specific spirits in Van Tiggele: 
 
‘Thus imports may be impeded in particular when a national authority 
fixes price or profits margins at such a level that imported products are 
placed at a disadvantage in relation to identical domestic products either 
because they cannot profitably be marketed in the conditions laid down or 
because the competitive advantage conferred by lower cost prices is 
cancelled out.’34[emphasis added] 
 
However, for the development of the single market, this kind of approach 
would have been far too restrictive. These cases relate to the very narrow 
situation where an identical domestic product exists and the rules have 
disparate impact on the imported version.  Where an importer cannot 
point to an identical comparator, they would have to show domestic 
products which, if not identical, are competitors in economic terms.35 
They would also have to show discrimination by reference to empirical 
evidence. In the context of private litigation, this is difficult, costly and 
complex. The case-law with the World Trade Organization on the 
meaning of ‘like’ products shows just how difficult such questions can 
                                                          
32
 In WTO trade law terms, we might be tempted to see this as reflecting the obligation to confer 
‘national treatment’ upon imported goods once in circulation contained in GATT Article III. 
However, this obligation requires close analysis of the product markets concerned to demonstrate 
de facto discrimination in conditions of competition. 
33
 C-8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville  [1974] 837 Para 7. 
34
 C-8/77 Openbaar Ministerie v Van Tiggele [1978] ECR 25 at para 14. 
35
 The Court was developing its market analysis tests in the competition field with definitions of 
the relevant market in C-27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207. 
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become.36  
 
Since these early cases, the European Court has been trying to develop 
new trade law concepts that make market integration easier. This was 
particularly important if the direct effect of community law was to have 
any real force as an engine of change. Litigation by private parties should 
not be too costly or uncertain.37 As Davies has recognized, using the 
standard economic tools of trade law or competition law to identify 
markets would be extremely onerous.38  The court recognized that the 
building of the single market through negative integration would be 
impossible without a move away from market equivalence tests for 
discrimination.39  
 
(b)  Cassis- the Move to Regulatory Equivalence 
 
In Cassis40, the ECJ freed itself from the constraints of the market 
equivalence test of the Article 90 case-law and the identical/competing 
goods factual scenarios that arose in Dassonville/Van Tiggele. It did so 
by choosing a regulatory equivalence test. This meant that it did not need 
to identify economic competitors in the strict sense outlined above. 
Clearly Cassis was a drink that was rather different in character from the 
higher alcohol drinks already on the German market. Analysis of fruit 
liqueurs as against schnapps etc might have revealed separate product 
markets.41 However, in Cassis the importers goods fell into a group - 
‘alcoholic drinks’- that were essentially similar from a regulatory point of 
view. Such drinks presented broadly the same issues of product safety, 
public health, anti-social behavior etc that might cause the authorities to 
regulate them. Authorities in other Member States might take a different 
view about how to regulate such products but these differences should 
not become arbitrary barriers to trade.   In such circumstances the court 
said: 
 
‘There is therefore no valid reason why, provided that they have been 
                                                          
36
 Matsushita et al put it thus ‘The “like” product determination is one of the thorniest in 
GATT/WTO jurisprudence.’ Matushita M, Schoenbaum TJ, Mavroidis PC, The World Trade 
Organization (2006) Oxford University Press at 236. 
37
 We can contrast the strong private enforcement element in removing state barriers to trade with 
the continued lack of such enforcement in EC competition law which is presently the subject of 
Commission discussion. One explanation is the sheer complexity of economic analysis required 
to bring such cases. See European Commission. Green Paper. Damages Actions for Breach of the 
EC Antitrust Rules. COM (2005) 672 final. 
38
 G. Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market (Kluwer Law 
International, 2003) at 88. 
39
 See JHH Weiler, ‘The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and Context in the 
Evolution of the Free Movement of Goods’ in Craig  P. and De Burca G.(eds), The Evolution of 
EU Law (Oxford, OUP, 1999) who argues that, although the language and policy issues under 
Article 28 were open to differing solutions, the Court made a deliberate choice to go beyond the 
protectionist approach of GATT. 
40
 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
41
 See the extensive alcoholic case-law under Article 90 which did indeed find that many drinks 
were in distinct and non-competing markets. For example, Case 243/84 [1986] ECR 875 John 
Walker. 
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lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic 
beverages should not be introduced to any other Member State.’42 
 
The Court perhaps deliberately eschewed the language of discrimination 
in the Cassis decision. The term ‘indistinctly applicable’ has become 
established for these kinds of trading rules. The Court clearly wanted to 
move beyond comparisons between products on the home market and 
imports because this required careful identification of like goods.  The test 
became one of regulatory not market equivalence. One is looking at 
discrimination against the regulatory means chosen by other Member 
States. As Chalmers et al put it ‘Because the good has been regulated in 
France, the Germans must, in principle, accept the good sense of the 
French regulatory authorities and accept that what is good enough for the 
French is also likely to be good enough for the Germans.’43 Other 
Member States seek to meet the same regulatory choice in different 
ways.  Germany did not think that alcohol should be banned but 
regulated. France thought the same and adopted systems to ensure that 
lower alcohol products of adequate quality and labeling were permitted to 
be sold. Germany had to respect the French regulatory view unless it was 
demonstrated to be inadequate. A failure to do so was arbitrary 
discrimination against French regulatory standards given the German 
acceptance of alcoholic beverages on their market.44 
 
Despite this move away from market equivalence, in later cases the Court 
itself has sometimes attempted to locate the underlying the Cassis 
principle within a protectionism framework. It said in Gilli and Andres: 
 
‘In practice, the principal effect of provisions of this nature is to protect 
domestic production by prohibiting the putting onto the market of products 
from other Member States which do not answer the descriptions laid 
down by the national rules.’45 
 
Whilst understandable as a political attempt to locate Article 28 within 
traditional trade law thinking, this analysis is misleading for the reasons 
stated above. The Court’s decision in Cassis was an attempt to move 
away from comparisons between home producers and importers in favor 
of a comparison between regulators. The Cassis line of cases is in fact 
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 Para 14. 
43
 Chalmers D, Hadjiemmanuil C, Monti G and Tomkins A, European Union Law (2005) CUP at 
679. 
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 The presumption that the home regulator is a sufficient safeguard for the host state is of course 
rebuttable by reference to the mandatory requirements. This is where the European Court enters 
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satisfied that there are no alternative less restrictive means of meeting the host state’s policy 
goals.  The Cassis case is a careful tri-partite allocation of regulatory power between home and 
host Member States and the European Court of Justice. It is only concerned with policy goals and 
regulatory tools to meet them. It requires no analysis of the underlying product markets at all. 




 Case 788/79 Gilli and Andres [1980] E.C.R. 2071 at para 10. 
  11 
conspicuous for its total lack of analysis of product markets. Products are 
merely emissaries for a comparison between regulators’ approaches to 
regulation. This is ultimately a means of challenging arbitrary regulatory 
barriers to trade through negative harmonization and so the focus is 
rightly upon this question rather than any demonstrable protectionist 
effects in favor of identifiable domestic producers. This contrasts with the 
more exacting approach within the WTO which always requires proof of a 
competitive relationship between imports and domestic goods.46 A casual 
review of decisions under the GATT reveals how closely defined are (and 
must be) the product markets in question.47 The Cassis approach, by 
contrast, allows the European Court, in a single decision, to cut through 
swathes of regulation affecting a whole sector, such as alcoholic drinks. 
 
The Court has remained very unclear about this issue which is at the 
heart of its search for the appropriate balance between Member State 
and EC regulation of trade. Many commentators have tried to locate the  
Cassis line of cases as built on protectionism due to the ‘dual regulatory 
burden’. 48 This is said to impose ‘extra’ costs on importers who have to 
adapt their products to comply with the second set of rules. This 
argument is unconvincing for several reasons and does not reflect the 
methods of the European Court. First, the idea that a second set of 
regulations imposes impermissible costs is only valid on the critical 
assumption that the first set of regulations provides adequate protection 
for consumers in the second state. It is this assumption, rather than the 
extra costs which is crucial. Second, in the case-law the Court almost 
never seeks to examine the product markets to identify suitable 
comparators amongst domestic producers. Third, the Court also never 
seeks to show disparate impact by reference to empirical evidence. For 
example, home state producers may be equally disadvantaged by the 
national product standard rules, particularly if they are recent. There is no 
reason to presume that imports are specially affected.  Using standard 
trade law methodology, one would have to show through detailed 
statistical or qualitative evidence the effect on imports versus home 
goods.49  Finally, the protectionist dual burden argument would also 
depend upon arbitrary questions about how much home production (if 
any) there is. If there is none, then there can be no competitive 
advantage for home producers.50  Indeed, this very difficulty in utilizing 
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 See Qin at 247. 
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 See Matushita et al  above at 236-240. 
48
 See Wyatt and Dashwood,  European Union Law (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) at 329, 
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application by reliance on the notion of the protectionist ‘dual burden’ of regulatory rules in the 
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 In relation to Article III GATT prohibition on on de facto discrimination under the national 
treatment standard see United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages  
19/6/92 GATT BISD (39th Supp) at 206 (1993).  
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 It may be better to suggest that, rather than dual burdens being felt by importers, product rules 
are worthy of close scrutiny because they clearly impose costs on importers and are therefore 
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traditional discrimination concepts to tackle such barriers to trade led, in 
the World Trade Organization context, to the TBT and SPS agreements. 
These use internationally agreed product standards, if any, rather than 
home state regulators as the principle tool to combat disparate national 
regulations. 51 
 
(c)  Keck: the Limits of Regulatory Equivalence  
 
The Keck decision52 of course held that Article 28 does not apply to 
selling rules. This is subject to the famous proviso that regulations must 
‘affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic 
products and of those from other Member States.’53 This suggests that 
rules which discriminate directly or indirectly are caught by Article 28. 
Rules which are de jure unequal do not present a problem. Given that the 
Court has made such extensive use of this proviso, the crucial question is 
what test of equivalence has it employed when assessing this inequality 
‘in fact’?  
 
Given the market-opening power of the Cassis approach, the Court might 
have been tempted to employ it to tackle selling rules. This would have 
required the ECJ to formulate the test as a presumption that selling 
arrangements practiced lawfully in the home state are acceptable 
throughout the EU. This was indeed the thinking behind pre-Keck cases 
like Oesthoek54 where particular selling techniques had already been 
adopted by the importer in their home state. The logic of Cassis says that 
all Member States can be trusted, in principle, only to permit selling 
techniques that do not damage important public interests. Perhaps the 
importer should be able to use selling techniques permitted in any 
Member State for that type of product. It is not impossible to envisage a 
test of this kind. 
 
However, there is a more fundamental objection. The importer in many 
such cases is seeking to engage in practices in the host state that are 
offensive to the latter’s regulatory goals. Unlike the Cassis rules, which 
were designed to deal with relatively minor disparities in the form of 
product specification regulations, here the host state typically believes the 
marketing activity in question is damaging to some aspect of cultural or 
social life. That is why such methods are banned. The fact that the home 
                                                                                                                                                             
barriers to trade. Such rules are therefore not de minimis in their effects on inter-state trade and 
engage the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 28. Whether they impose extra  costs compared 
to domestic producers is another (empirical) question which is impossible and unnecessary to 
answer. 
51
 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures. 
52




 C-286/81 Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij BV [1982] ECR 4575. The importer was banned 
from using a sales technique that it had employed in its home member state. The court here 
seemed to draw upon the fact that the selling techniques had already been approved and 
employed in the home state to suggest they should prima facie be acceptable to other Member 
States.  
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state may authorize such marketing methods provides no reassurance to 
the host state because it broadly disapproves of such practices on its 
territory. There is no regulatory equivalence between home and imported 
producers. Qin reaches a similar conclusion in a detailed review of United 
States jurisprudence on challenges to trade barriers under the commerce 
clause.55 She shows how the Supreme Court has held that traders 
seeking to engage in marketing practices that were legitimately prohibited 
are not similarly situated to those not so engaging.56 
 
So stage one of the Cassis approach, home state regulation, does not 
provide the same protection for the host state’s values. Furthermore, 
unlike product rules, labeling is often not going to meet the regulatory 
objective. The test of alternative means supervised by the European 
Court does not provide a solution here. In fact, in Keck the Court rightly 
recognized that the Cassis test of regulatory equivalence is misplaced in 
the context of selling arrangements.  This is because marketing rules are 
often an end in themselves rather than a means to another goal such as 
consumer protection. The selling rules of the host state are the 
embodiment of its regulatory choices for its population. The choice to 
keep Sunday a special day, protect impressionable children from intrusive 
advertising or limit consumption of alcohol cannot be met by home state 
regulations or  importers changing their products or their marketing 
methods.57  All producers, both home and importers, are subject to the 
rules. Such regulatory schemes are not prima facie arbitrary because 
they pursue policy goals in a consistent fashion and discriminate only in 
ways that are consonant with such goals. 
 
If the regulatory equivalence test is inappropriate in the case of selling 
arrangements, is it legitimate to employ the more standard market 
equivalence test in selling arrangements cases? Arguably the Court 
cannot pick and choose when to look at regulatory purpose to determine 
whether goods are similar. It cannot simply use regulatory purpose when, 
as in Cassis, it yields market opening results and then abandon it when, 
as in De Agostini or Gourmet Foods, it does not.58  In defence of the 
                                                          
55
 J Y Qin, ‘Defining Nondiscrimination under the Law of the World Trade Organization.’ 23 
Boston Univ. International L.J. [2005] 215 at 225-230. See also D Regan, ‘The Supreme Court 
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 Bread v Alexandria 341 U.S. 622 (1951) in which a ban on door-to-door sales of magazines 
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 Broad restrictions on commercialization of products that are lawfully sold presents greater 
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Court it might be argued that where an importer can clearly show that a 
measure is harming their ability to compete with a national producer in an 
economically well-defined market, the regulator should then bear a 
burden of demonstrating that the rules are necessary and proportionate 
to meet a legitimate policy goal. The demonstration of such truly 
protectionist effects are a clear harm in trade law terms that switches the 
burden onto the Member State to show that there was no such purpose 
behind the measure. 
 
However let us leave that point of principle aside for the moment and 
consider what employing a market equivalence test looks like in selling 
arrangement cases. The Court helpfully did this in Commission v Greece 
(formula milk monopoly),59 an early post-Keck case. The facts concerned 
a Greek law banning retail sales of formula milk except in pharmacies. 
Importers argued that sales in supermarkets would allow for greater 
volumes and reductions in price, expanding the market. The ban applied 
equally in law. Greece did not produce formula milk. The Commission 
and AG Lenz argued that therefore ‘in fact’ the ban affected only 
importers and was caught by the proviso in Keck.  The Court rejected this  
and then made it clear that the market equivalence test was the correct 
one to apply in such cases so that Article 28 would only bite: 
 
‘if it was apparent that the legislation at issue protected domestic 
products which were similar to processed milk for infants from other 
Member States or which were in competition with milk of that 
type.’[emphasis added]60 
 
As noted above, this is exactly the approach to tax discrimination under 
Article 90 and represents a demanding standard for importers to satisfy. 
They would have to engage in the detailed empirical analysis so typical of 
competition and WTO trade law cases. Where there is no competing 
product, then the importer cannot begin to prove discrimination. The 
market may simply have to remain largely un-penetrated.61   
 
(d). Post-Keck – the Move to Status Equivalence 
 
With these difficulties in mind, the Court has since abandoned serious 
use of the market equivalence test set out in Commission v Greece in 
‘selling arrangements’ cases. It has also eschewed the regulatory 
equivalence approach – suggested in Oesthoek - that would require 
mutual recognition of marketing practices. It has instead chosen to avoid 
these complexities by conferring what I call ‘status equivalence’ on 
importers of goods who lawfully enter the host market. Take the case of 
                                                                                                                                                             
competitor need be shown, although there may well be such. 
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 C-391/92 [1995] ECR I-1621 
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 Para 18. The Court is of course mindful that the milk from a mother’s breast, although not a 
‘good’ in Community law terms, is clearly the market leader.  
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 On breaking down selling arrangements barriers to trade see G Davies, ‘Can Selling 
Arrangements be Harmonized?’ [2005]  30 ELRev 370. 
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De Agostini62 where the facts concerned a ban on the advertising aimed 
at children on television. It was argued that this discriminated in fact 
against importers because they found it harder (than domestic 
companies) to obtain market share without access to this marketing 
medium. The first question should have been to establish specific 
markets in which actual or potential competition might take place between 
domestic and imported goods63 In fact, the Court did not engage in any of 
this reasoning.  It did not investigate the market but simply adopted the 
proviso in Keck saying that the rules must affect in the same way ‘the 
marketing of national products and of products from other Member 
States.’64 The Court then said: 
 
‘it cannot be excluded that an outright ban, applying in one Member 
State, of a type of promotion for a product which is lawfully sold there  
might have a greater impact on products from other Member 
States.’[emphasis added] 65 
 
Applying this later on in Gourmet the Court said: 
 
‘ A prohibition on advertising…must therefore be regarded as affecting 
the marketing of products from other Member States more heavily than 
the marketing of domestic products…’[emphasis added] 66 
 
These two cases seem to reflect a rule that confers equal status upon 
importers whose goods are lawfully sold on the domestic market. It says 
that importers must be viewed as equivalent to home traders. The trading 
environment must therefore not impede their ability to penetrate the 
market in a manner which is directly or indirectly discriminatory. Rules 
which have a tendency to disadvantage imported goods are considered 
indirectly discriminatory.  Cassis took goods lawfully sold in the home 
state as meeting regulatory equivalence. Post-Keck cases create a 
presumption that importers of goods lawfully sold in the host state have a 
status equivalent to home producers of such goods. This is the same 
reasoning as the ECJ adopted in relation to citizens in the line of cases 
from Sala to Collins.67 Goods importers must not experience disparate 
impacts caused by the regulatory backgrounds they encounter in host 
states. At first sight, this appears perfectly reasonable, however as we 
shall, in reality it makes very little sense. 
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(e) The Incoherence and Danger of Status Equivalence for Goods 
 
The use of status equivalence to assess the impact of background 
regulations on importers is seductive. Convenient as it is however, it fails 
to convince as an intellectually coherent exercise. This is because the 
cases considered by the court all concern differential ‘market’ access. 
Market access requires definition of a market. On the facts of the 
Gourmet and De Agostini cases the rules controlled broad industrial 
sectors – alcoholic drinks and products for children. The court takes these 
as suitable comparators without explaining why. This solution relies on 
very loose ideas about the ‘products’ to be given equal status.68 Unlike 
real people, who are all considered equal in status as a political fact 
inherent in their status as Community citizens or workers and so forth, 
‘goods’ are clearly not all the same. Nor, for that matter, are alcoholic 
drinks or children’s products.  
 
The bestowing of status equivalence on an imported good demands an 
explanation as to what other goods it should be given ‘equal rights’ to. In 
fact, products regulated by restrictions on selling sometimes have nothing 
remotely in common. This is obvious when one moves to marketing 
restrictions that limit the marketing of disparate classes of products.  
Where, for example, restrictions cover a wide range of wholly 
unconnected products such as were in issue in the Sunday trading 
litigation. Another example is the advertising ban in Leclerc-Siplec69 
which applied to disparate products. Simply choosing to regulate the 
marketing of a group of products cannot suddenly make them similar to 
each other such for the purposes of trade law. 
 
Clearly the European Court has in mind the idea that some marketing 
rules are ‘protectionist’ in that they favor national producers in some 
sections of the regulated markets.  If this is so, these ‘protected’ portions 
of the market must surely be identified. When we look at the Gourmet 
Foods case we can see that the European Court contradicts the findings 
of it’s own case-law in the tax discrimination cases. It appeared to rule 
that the Swedish restrictions were discriminatory against all importers (or 
potential importers) of all alcoholic drinks. However, the numerous cases 
brought under Article 90 make it very clear that there is only competition 
within some sections of the alcoholic beverage ‘market’.70 For example 
Commission v United Kingdom (wine/beer) held that only light wines were 
in competition with beers.71 Outside of these sections, alcoholic drinks are 
simply not equivalent products. Discrimination analysis cannot begin to 
bite. We can support Gourmet Foods in so far as it concluded that some 
sections of the Swedish drinks industry were in competition with imports 
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but not the whole market.72  
 
To conclude that a Member State is protecting a domestic producer is a 
serious allegation which requires credible evidence and analysis. Such a 
finding imposes a heavy burden of justification on the Member State. 
However the Court has used comparators which do not have any basis in 
standard trade law concepts of discrimination. They are usually simply 
the result of the regulators choice of which product or sector to regulate.  
As well as being inconsistent with trade law concepts, this is inconsistent 
with the Court’s own case-law on discrimination under Article 90.   
 
Of course, market equivalence tests, even when properly conducted, are 
limited in what they can achieve in terms of internal market integration. 
Thus where there is no competing domestic production there can be no 
discrimination and hence trade barriers would have to remain. However 
the post-Keck case-law seeks to mitigate this problem by being over-
inclusive. Once there is any hypothetical competition between imports 
and home goods, the whole regulatory scheme may be subject to striking 
down, even though there may only be competition within a sub-market. 
However this is not legitimate if Article 28 is truly just an anti-protectionist 
tool. The ‘discrimination’ felt by some importers in some sections of the 
market has become a lever to deregulate the regulated sector to the 
benefit of all producers, wherever situated. This goes beyond combating 
protectionism into negative harmonization of non-product rules. 
 
It is suggested that, if discrimination analysis is to be used, the only 
tenable approach is that of market equivalence that the Court discussed 
in Commission v Greece where it said that the goods must actually be 
economic competitors. The Court in De Agostini and Gourmet did not 
attempt any economic analysis to isolate these competitors and so it is 
impossible to say if discrimination was occurring.73 
 
(f) Intuitive Discrimination in the post-Keck Case-Law – The Failure to 
Show Disparate Impact 
 
This failure to define the markets where competition takes place with 
some precision is serious. However, the post-Keck case-law is also 
deficient for failing to probably consider the next step in discrimination 
analysis - to show disparate impact on imported goods.  The Court has 
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developed a series of intuitive rules that point towards discrimination but 
again these bear little relation to empirical evidence. Thus in DocMorris74 
the foreign retailer of drugs was challenging a rule banning sales other 
than in pharmacies. The court made no attempt to analysis the goods 
markets in question. The restriction was actually felt by a service provider 
(retailer) and so clearly Article 49 might apply. However for foreign goods 
producers to be disadvantaged one would have to examine the degree of 
competition between home and foreign drugs. Then one would have to 
look at the range of drugs stocked by retailers at home and abroad. Only 
then could one say that there was competition between foreign drug 
producers seeking to enter the market and home producer incumbents. 
Analysis of the market might reveal that home retailers sold more foreign 
drugs than domestic ones and vice versa. It is not possible to adopt such 
a priori presumptions in a complex and integrating market like the EU. 
Even assuming domestic domination of product markets, one must show 
that importers face barriers to using existing wholesale or retail networks 
in the target markets. Only after all these empirical hurdles have been 
overcome can we say that discrimination is established. 
 
In other cases the court has relied upon the notion that the market 
concerned is typified by customary patterns of consumption which are 
said to discriminate against importers. We can see such an approach in 
the Gourmet Foods75 decision where the Court says ‘in the case of 
products like alcoholic beverages, the consumption of which is linked to 
traditional social practices and to local habits and customs’ a ban on 
advertising is ‘liable to impede access to the market by products from 
other Member States more than it impedes access by domestic 
producers.’  This is a general assertion, which was not based upon 
evidence about conditions in the actual market in question. In fact this 
conclusion applied ‘[e]ven without its being necessary to carry out precise 
analysis of the facts characteristic of the Swedish situation…’76. The 
Court fails to provide any tools of analysis nor evidence to justify  its 
conclusions nor to provide guidance on how this might be applied to other 
markets. It would appear to reflect the Court’s view that, in general, any 
such restrictions must fall within Article 28, even where imports already 
dominate the sector. This looks like market access rather than rigorous 
discrimination analysis. 
 
The Court has also used a sort of sliding scale of degrees of interference 
upon importers ability to enter the market.77 Thus it is said that only if the 
marketing restrictions are sufficiently grave (a complete ban on 
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advertising, for example) can there be discrimination. It is assumed that 
such bans will have a disparate impact on importers without looking at the 
market or the mechanism.78 However this is not a credible or operable 
approach. Importers will rightly say that any restrictions on marketing 
impede them. Their commercial acumen and relative prices of marketing 
will dictate which is the best technique to gain market share. Advertising 
is only one method and it may be too costly even if available. In economic 
terms, incumbents are protected to the extent that any marketing 
techniques used by potential competitors are prohibited. The below-cost 
selling in Keck is such an example. Of course, incumbents may also wish 
to expand their market share by using such forbidden techniques. The 
market for goods is not simply a fixed pie with incumbents favoured by 
restrictions. Incumbents may bitterly resent their inability to use to 
aggressive marketing. They may believe they would be able to increase 
sales and profits if given the chance.  
 
It would appear to be very difficult for courts to use forensic methods to 
assess the relative impact of these effects in terms of ‘discrimination’ 
against importers.  All marketing regulation restricts competition but does 
it thereby restrict imports in particular? Given these uncertainties, it is no 
wonder that national courts have been referring large numbers of cases 
which ask the European Court to apply the facts to the post-Keck 
principles. The Court however has recently decided to vote with its feet 
and pass cases back to the national courts to force them to consider such 
imponderable questions.79 This is valid as a matter of allocation of 
competence, but the European Court has created such vague principles 
that it is hard to blame the national courts for trying to get answers. 
 
We can conclude that the balance of the post-Keck case-law on Article 28 
follows an uneasy path.  It is steadfastly rejects analysis of the relevant 
markets where competition is actually taking place but formally maintains 
that preventing discrimination in the conditions of competition is the key 
focus of Article 28. However the effects of the European Courts’ decisions 
go far beyond simply eliminating protection for national producers. They 
are more deregulatory than that because they permit the removal of the 
whole of a regulatory apparatus once this kind of ‘discrimination’ against 
any import is established. It begins to look like judicial sleight of hand in 
which ‘market access’ practice is being cloaked in discrimination 
language.80 The court itself may be beginning to acknowledge this in 
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recent cases like Douwe Egberts81 which appear to adopt both market 
access and differential impact approaches cumulatively.  
 
D: Conclusions: Moving Beyond Discrimination in Goods Cases 
 
The establishment of a single market required creative development of 
discrimination thinking by the European Court beyond  the standard tool 
of trade law – the market equivalence test.  To help traders easily 
challenge regulatory barriers in the face of continued national legal 
diversity, the court developed the regulatory equivalence presumption. 
This test has now begun to be discussed in trade law more generally.82 
Non-product rules have however presented new challenges in 
discrimination methodology because they do not fit into the regulatory 
equivalence model.  Since Keck the Court’s case-law on goods has 
become confused. It has maintained the language of discrimination in 
scrutinizing non-product rules but has not found a coherent methodology. 
It has failed to use either the market or regulatory equivalence tests that 
are both well-established and provide clear analytical tools. Instead, the 
Court has attempted to find a third method, derived from the case-law on 
persons, that of status equivalence. However a rule that says that all 
imported goods lawfully on the host market are entitled to equal treatment 
with other home goods has failed to produce workable rules.  This idea of 
status equivalence should be reserved for the more political equality that 
underpins the free movement of citizens and natural persons.83  
 
If discrimination analysis is to be retained for non-product rules, the only 
workable methodology that is consistent with trade law theory is that of 
market equivalence.84 This requires careful empirical consideration of the 
relevant markets where competition is taking place. It may be felt that this 
would largely nullify Article 28 as a tool of market integration through 
private litigation because of the costs and limited reach of such methods. 
However an alternative approach might be to abandon discrimination 
analysis whilst retaining the underlying principle behind it that has 
animated much of the European Court’s jurisprudence.  Discrimination is 
useful as a means of indicating arbitrariness in a scheme of trading rules. 
In a developed trading system like that of the EU, arguably the ultimate 
goal should be the removal of arbitrary barriers to trade. This lies at the 
heart of the Cassis De Djion decision. A misleading and incoherent 
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established regulatory equivalence as the touchstone for Article 28 in the Cassis line of cases. It 
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unfavourable results. 
  21 
discrimination finding is a side-track from this main question. There is a 
significant danger that a finding of ‘discrimination’ by judicial fiat wrongly 
puts the burden of justification on the Member State in relation to 
perfectly sensible rules. This is the discrimination tail wagging the dog of 
arbitrariness. Ultimately, a well-grounded discrimination test is a good 
indicator of an arbitrary barrier to trade but a poorly considered one is 
merely misleading.  
 
It is important to state that many selling rules are not arbitrary at all but 
reflect deeply-held policy choices about the character of national life. We 
can see however that in the recent case-law some of the national rules in 
issue did go beyond that which was necessary to meet the policy goal. In 
the DocMorris case85 the court claimed to find discrimination against 
imports without looking at the markets for competing drugs. A better 
approach would be to simply say the rules banning internet selling were 
arbitrary because they were not necessary to protect consumers in 
relation to non-prescription drugs. Similarly, the Heimdienst86 rules 
requiring deliveries of groceries to be made only from local premises 
were arbitrary because they were not necessary to maintain food 
hygiene.87 There is no need to rely upon the proxy of discrimination in 
such cases. 
 
However adopting this approach need not lead to a deregulatory spiral or 
plunge the courts into the kinds of non-justiciable questions that featured 
during the Sunday trading saga. Selling and marketing restrictions should 
be presumed to impede trade where they go beyond de minimis levels. 
On the other hand, they should not be presumed to be arbitrary. This is 
because they are usually objectives in themselves that cannot be met by 
home state regulators. Therefore traders should have the burden of 
showing that they are not necessary to meet legitimate policy goals. 
Where the rules seek to meet intangible goals such as preserving the 
character of national cultural life or reducing gambling or alcohol 
consumption, this will be a very high hurdle to surmount.88 Such 
questions are largely non-justiciable as the court itself has, perhaps 
grudgingly, accepted in cases concerning ‘social morality’ like Schindler.89 
It is easy to see many of the selling rules cases as falling into similar 
categories.  It is notable that when reviewing actions by the EU 
institutions, the European Court has readily recognized that there are 
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policy areas where regulators have a wide discretion that is largely 
beyond judicial review.90  
 
Finally, even if the subject matter is justiciable, courts should not pretend 
to be regulators. Courts cannot (re)devise complex systems of regulation 
nor do they have the legitimacy to do so.91 The beauty of Cassis was that 
courts did not have to function as primary regulators – the home state did 
that for them.  Recognizing this strikes a sensible balance in relation to 
marketing rules. It meets the concern about excessive recourse to Article 
28 but acknowledges that selling rules may sometimes be arbitrary such 
that courts can discern less restrictive means to meet the policy 
objectives of Member States. 
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